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The Content of Animal Signals 
Ulrich Stegmann  
 
Animal signals are usually defined as structures or behaviors that evolved in order to carry 
information about the sender or the environment. They are taken to represent or indicate things; they 
have some kind of ‘content.’ But the nature of that content or information is not well understood. Most 
researchers of animal communication gravitate towards quantitative information concepts when 
pressed, but some regard information as awkward baggage that had better be jettisoned. In philosophy, 
animal signals have mostly figured as foil for discussing human language or as occasional examples in 
naturalistic accounts of information and representation. They became the subject of focused inquiries 
only fairly recently. 
This chapter surveys current views about the content of animal signals. The views are drawn from 
both the ethological and the philosophical literature. Some of them have not been explicitly articulated 
before, especially the views in animal behavior studies. My formulations are therefore also attempts to 
explicate them. For simplicity, I formulate them in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions and 
presuppose that certain behaviors mean/indicate something in the first place. This allows focusing on 
what makes a signal mean/indicate one thing rather than another (i.e. the conditions for content 
determination).   
 
From human communication to animal signals 
Human linguistic communication is usually understood in broadly Gricean terms. On this view, 
linguistic communication involves not only sentences and their meanings, but also complex mental 
states, especially intentions to communicate and the ability to attribute mental states to others. In 
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addition, linguistic communication tends to serve as a general paradigm for communication and 
therefore often informs views on animals. Accordingly, genuine communication in animals is 
sometimes taken to require communicative intentions and mental state attributions; for otherwise 
signals seem little more than automatic manifestations of affective states (Dennett 1983). But Gricean 
communication demands cognitive sophistication. Some philosophers therefore distinguish between 
strong, Gricean communication and communication in a weak sense, as information transfer. Animal 
communication is then regarded as an instance of the latter, in which certain behaviors and structures 
merely have the biological function to convey information (e.g. Bennett 1976; Green 2007).  
The distinction between Gricean communication and information transfer is useful. But it should 
not be confused with the claim that human and animal communication diverge neatly. First, even if 
communicative intentions are unnecessary, animal receivers may need mental representations in order 
to decode signal content (Tetzlaff and Rey 2009) or motivate action (Rescorla 2013). Second, the 
general absence in animals of mental abilities required for Gricean communication is contested. 
Gestural communication in many non-human primates, for instance, is under the sender’s volitional 
control (Pika et al. 2007) and conveys a range of meanings (Hobaiter and Byrne 2014). Evidence for 
control over auditory signal production is mixed (e.g. Fedurek and Slocombe 2011; Schel et al. 2013). 
An even more complex picture emerges with respect to mental state attributions (e.g. Fedurek and 
Slocombe 2011; Andrews 2012; Keefner 2016).  
Irrespective of these complications, the “signaling model” (Green 2007) chimes with the dominant 
view in animal behavior studies. On this view, animals communicate by conveying information from 
senders to receivers, with signals as the physical vehicles by which information is conveyed, and 
receivers acting on the basis of the information received (e.g. Bradbury and Vehrencamp 2011). The 
waggle dance of honeybees, for example, does not simply elicit receiver responses. Instead, the dance 
conveys specific information about the location of a resource to recruits, which then depart in that 
direction because they have been so informed. The informational view of animal communication is 
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entrenched in contemporary animal behavior studies: signals are routinely defined in terms of 
information {{633 Otte, D. 1974/pe.g. ;}}, several classifications of signals are based on their 
information content,1 and the evolutionary origin and maintenance of signaling systems is taken to 
hinge on signals conveying (true) information.2  
Yet, what is information supposed to be in this context? Some researchers are explicit in asserting 
that a signal carries information in the sense that it is about something or has content, and must 
therefore be distinguished from information in the quantitative sense (e.g. Halliday 1983). But such 
characterizations are too vague and abstract for some critics of the information view (e.g. Rendall et al. 
2009). Moreover, there exists no general and uncontroversial notion of content or information that one 
could simply apply to animal signals. The informational edifice therefore rests on poorly understood 
foundations. 
 
Signal content in the ethological literature 
In the ethological literature, the term “information” is often used interchangeably with what 
receivers come to know, infer or predict when perceiving a signal (e.g. Seyfarth et al. 2010). And 
acquiring knowledge from signals is often described as reducing a receiver’s uncertainty (Wiley 1983; 
Seyfarth and Cheney 2003; Bergstrom and Rosvall 2011; Wheeler et al. 2011). These practices 
suggest a first family of views about the content (X) of animal signals (S): 
 
[1] S’s content is X iff R infers/predicts/comes to know/becomes more confident that X, given S 
 
Consider a female firefly (R) perceiving a male’s light pulse (S). According to [1], the information 
carried by S depends on what the female infers from it. Plausibly she infers from S that there is a male 
conspecific willing to mate. The phrase following the that-clause is therefore the content of S. 
Encouragingly, this is just the kind of content that ethologists have actually attributed to male light 
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pulses: “Here I am in time and space, a sexually mature male of species X that is ready to mate” 
(Lloyd 1966, p. 69).  
However, [1] appeals to several distinct processes. Becoming more confident about X, for instance, 
does not imply knowing that X is true. Also, inferring and predicting is sometimes taken to include 
automatic responses based on reflexive associations and evolved dispositions (e.g. Krebs and Dawkins 
1984). So, [1] is much too vague to specify the content of animal signals. And simply settling on one 
of the processes will not do. A principled argument is required as to why one of the processes, rather 
than some other, qualifies as determining a signal’s content.  
There is evidence that some signals elicit mental representations in receivers. Rather than triggering a 
reflexive response, these so-called “representational” (Evans and Evans 2007) or “conceptual” signals 
(Zuberbühler et al. 1999) are assumed to have their effects on receivers via internal representations. 
Some authors go a step further and distinguish informational from non-informational interactions 
along these lines. Accordingly, a structure or behavior carries information only if it elicits a thought or 
mental image in the receiver, not if it triggers a reflexive response. The content of signals then tends to 
be identified with the content of the internal representation (Maynard Smith and Harper 2003; Seyfarth 
and Cheney 2003). Interestingly, the critics of the informational view have also sought to distinguish 
between informational and non-informational interactions and they come to broadly similar 
conclusions: interactions are informational if the receiver response relies on cortical as opposed to 
non-cortical processing (Rendall et al. 2009), or on cognitive as opposed to non-cognitive processing 
(Owings and Morton 1998). In short, at least some of the proponents and opponents of the information 
view agree to the extent that information is exchanged only if the receiver processes what it perceives 
by means of a higher-order mechanism. This suggests another group of views about content: 
 
[2] S’s content is X iff S elicits in R a cognitive or cortical representation of X/thought of 
X/mental image of X 
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Again, [2] offers several distinct higher-order mechanisms (e.g. cognitive processing does not 
imply mental imagery) and it is unclear which of these might determine signal content. Furthermore, 
organisms relying on lower-order mechanisms will not qualify as exchanging information. And this 
implication does not sit well with the usual understanding of communication in animal behavior 
studies.  
Faced with these challenges it may be tempting to seek refuge in quantitative frameworks. Two 
quantities, entropy and mutual information, have become particularly influential in ethology (e.g. 
Halliday 1983; Seyfarth et al. 2010; Wheeler et al. 2011). Shannon entropy is a measure of the number 
of different states, and their probabilities, that a system can assume. Systems with many, equally 
possible states (e.g. the six sides of fair dice) are associated with a higher degree of uncertainty about 
the system’s current state than systems with few possible states, of which one is very likely (e.g. bank 
vaults being locked/unlocked). Mutual information captures the statistical association between two 
such systems.  In the 1950s and 60s, several studies estimated the mutual information between signals 
and receiver responses (see Halliday 1983). However, since signals are not normally taken to be about 
their effects on receivers, this measure ("transmitted information", Wiley 1983) cannot capture a 
signal’s information content. Closer to the target is the mutual information between signals and the 
states they are about ("broadcast information", Wiley 1983). Hence the following idea: 
 
[3] S’s content is X iff S has non-zero mutual information with X 
 
However, Shannon’s quantities are not equivalent to (or a measure of) information in the 
colloquial sense of content, a point acknowledged by several early ethologists. One reason is that the 
quantities average across all the states a system can have, whereas content in the colloquial sense is 
not an average (Dretske 1981). Another reason is that S’s reducing R’s uncertainty about X is a 3-term 
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relation (involving S, R, and X), whereas mutual information is only a 2-term relation between S and 
X.  
Nowadays the preferred quantitative framework in animal behavior studies is statistical decision 
theory (Bradbury and Vehrencamp 2011). Its basic idea is that animals can use current perceptions to 
update their prior knowledge about events. Background knowledge stems from earlier experiences 
and/or evolutionary history. SDT employs Bayes’ theorem to derive posterior probabilities. The 
difference between posterior and prior probabilities is understood as measuring the animal’s 
uncertainty reduction about the state whose probability is being updated. The following account of 
content suggests itself: 
 
[4] S’s content is X iff S updates R’s expectation about X  
 
Bayesian probabilities are traditionally understood as degrees of belief. This raises the question of 
the nature of beliefs in, say, invertebrates and organisms lacking nervous systems. Perhaps to avoid 
these issues, SDT remains explicitly neutral about the mechanisms of updating (e.g. Bradbury and 
Vehrencamp 2011). But this strategy raises another problem. If SDT is simply employed as a 
predictive tool, then it justifies construing S merely as if having content.3   
 
Signal content as natural information  
Philosophers tend to regard the content of animal signals as an instance of either natural or semantic 
information.4 These two types of information are distinguished with respect to whether or not they 
allow for having false contents. Falsity requires that something can carry the information that p despite 
it’s being the case that not-p. For instance, the belief that it is Friday carries the information that it is 
Friday, which may or may not be true (semantic information). Tree rings, by contrast, are standard 
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examples of natural information. Six tree rings indicate that the tree is six years old, because the tree 
would normally not have six rings unless it actually was six years old.  
Just as tree rings are reliably caused by an annual period of slow growth, animal signals are often 
produced reliably in response to certain events or objects, e.g. predators. And so, just as tree rings 
indicate age, animal signals indicate various events or objects. This core idea has been developed in 
different ways. Some authors rely on strong versions of natural information, according to which one 
state indicates another only if the first could not obtain without the second; a signal thus guarantees 
that the indicated state obtains (Dretske 1981; Adams and Beighley 2013). But most commentators 
believe that such strict relations rarely obtain. Another group of theories therefore allow that a state 
can carry information about another even if the first can obtain without the second (Millikan 2004; 
Shea 2007; Skyrms 2010). A well-articulated theory of this sort is defended by Scarantino (2015).  
A centerpiece of Scarantino’s theory of natural information is that one state carries information 
about another when the first makes the second more likely (or less likely):  
 
“Incremental Natural Information (INI): r’s being G carries incremental natural information 
about s’s being F relative to background data d if and only if p(s is F|r is G & d) ≠ p(s is F|d)” 
(Scarantino 2015) 
 
The key idea can be put as follows. Entity s has a certain prior probability of being F given some 
background data. Then r is observed to be G. This fact may or may not make a difference as to 
whether s is F. If it does make a difference to the probability of s’s being F (by making it more likely, 
or less likely, that s is F), then r’s being G carries information about s’s being F. Notice that the 
information content of r’s being G is not (only) that s is F. This is because the occurrence of a state of 
affairs usually affects the probabilities of many states rather than just one. Scarantino’s formal 
definition of information content is too complex to reproduce here; suffice it to say that it includes 
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three features: the identity of the states whose probabilities are changed, the amount of change, and 
their probabilities after the change. Scarantino holds that animal signals carry information in this 
sense. For instance, for vervet monkeys there is always a certain background probability that an eagle 
approaches. But hearing an eagle-alarm call makes that event much more likely. Eagle alarm-calls 
therefore carry incremental information about the presence of eagles. Hence: 
 
[5] S’s content is X iff S changes the probability of X 
 
Animal signals do change the probabilities of other states. However, I am not convinced that this is 
the kind of information which scientists actually attribute to signals and which figures in their 
explanations and predictions (Stegmann 2015). First, INI-contents are much broader than the contents 
attributed by ethologists. For instance, the content ethologists attribute to the eagle-alarm calls of 
vervet monkeys is that an eagle is approaching. But their INI-content includes an array of additional 
states, e.g. the eagle having been detected, the eagle’s foraging success being reduced, the caller 
interrupting foraging, the receiver taking evasive action, and so on.  
Second, signals carry weak natural information if they are sometimes produced in the absence of 
the states whose probabilities they change. But are signal tokens produced in the absence of the 
correlated state informative? If yes, then they would appear to carry the information that p despite not-
p and, hence, false information. This would contradict the widely held view that natural information 
cannot be false (e.g. Dretske 1981; Millikan 2004; Adams and Beighley 2013). One might claim, 
instead, that the information is not actually p alone, but rather a disjunction of all states causing or 
correlating with the signal, i.e. <p or q or …>. This disjunctive content is true even if in a particular 
instance p does not obtain (Adams and Beighley 2013). This move, however, spells trouble for signals 
whose contents are taken to be specific (see above). A third option is to deny that such tokens carry 
any natural information (Millikan 2004). But in that case carrying information cannot merely be a 
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matter of being an instance of a probabilistically related type, contradicting the very notion of weak 
natural information (Stegmann 2015). Furthermore, this option is at odds with the ethological practice 
of classifying such signals as indicating falsely or “dishonestly” (e.g. Maynard Smith and Harper 
2003).   
Let us step back from these objections and take a broader look. It has been argued that there exists 
a group of signals that do more than simply carry natural information. So-called “expressive 
behaviors” (Bar-On and Green 2010) are designed to “express” or “show” an animal’s affective states. 
Affective states are directed towards events or objects, which are their non-propositional intentional 
objects (e.g. excitement about food). Expressive behaviors are said to carry natural information about 
the things that reliably cause them. But they are also “precursor[s] of linguistic behavior” (Bar-On and 
Green 2010, p. 104), both because they express states with intentional objects and because they are 
designed to elicit appropriate receiver responses. One might therefore construe expressive behaviors as 
having a kind of content:  
 
[6] S’s content is X if S is designed to express X, where X = <affective state directed at non-
propositional intentional object> 
 
On this reading, the content of an (expressive) signal is a certain mental state and its intentional 
object. In a similar vein, Proust (2016) suggests that mental states called “affordance-sensings” 
mediate the exchange of animal signals. Affordances are, roughly, the behavioral opportunities that a 
situation allows or requires. Signals convey affordances; they do not refer to states in the world.  
It may be objected that even signals expressing affective states can carry propositional content. 
Arguably, one must distinguish between (1) signal production, which is the expression of an affective 
state, and (2) the product (signal) itself, which could have propositional content. McAninsh et al. 
(2009) make this point and argue that at least some animal signals are of this kind. This brings us to 
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theories according to which the content of animal signals is an instance of semantic information or, 
equivalently, representational content.  
 
Signal content as semantic information 
Dretske (1988) proposed a general theory of representational content, according to which a state 
represents another just in case it has the function to carry natural information about the other. Hence: 
 
[7] S’s content is X iff S has the biological function to carry natural information about X  
 
The appeal to function avoids the ubiquity worry raised against probabilistic accounts. But other 
challenges emerge. One is that many signals do not guarantee that the represented state obtains or even 
make it likely. Furthermore, some signals evolved in order to “deceive” receivers, i.e. to represent 
falsehoods, and [6] cannot account for their content. Predatory fireflies, for instance, mimic the light 
pulses sent by females of other species and consequently lure males of those species to their deaths. 
For the predators’ signals to falsely represent the presence of females, they would need to have 
evolved in order to indicate the presence of females. But they systematically fail to achieve that 
function. So probably their function is to mislead males. But then they do not represent females.  
While Dretske’s (1988) account ties content exclusively to the signal producer, Millikan’s account 
(2004) includes the receiver. Signal-producing mechanisms (in the sender) evolved in order to issue 
signals in response to certain conditions, so that variations in the signals’ physical features map to 
variations in the conditions. The time and location of a beaver’s tail splash, for example, correspond to 
present danger, just as the specific features of a bee’s waggle dance correspond to a certain location 
relative to the hive. Signal-consuming mechanisms (in the receiver) evolved to respond with behaviors 
that benefit both sender and receiver, such as taking cover or flying to the signaled location. Another 
important component of Millikan’s theory are “normal conditions”. This is a technical term for the 
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states of affairs that obtain when mechanisms achieve their functions in the way that explains the 
mechanisms’ evolution, rather by accidental means. For instance, the normal condition of the 
consuming mechanism of beaver tail-splashes is the presence of danger, because this co-occurrence 
obtains when the mechanism achieves its function in the way that explains its evolution. Recall that 
this co-occurrence is also the function of the tail-splash producing mechanisms. So, the normal 
condition of a consuming mechanism is that the producing mechanism achieves its function, and vice 
versa; signal-producing and -consuming devices must “cooperate” in this manner. With these elements 
in place, Millikan identifies representational content as the state of affairs to which the signal evolved 
to correspond and whose co-occurrence with the signal is the normal condition of the consuming 
device.  
 
[8] S’s content is X iff (1) X is the state to which S evolved to correspond and (2) S’s co-
occurrence with X is the normal condition of the consuming mechanism  
 
Millikan’s theory reconstructs the specificity of many signals. For instance, in the case of the light 
pulses of male fireflies, X is the presence of a male firefly ready to mate. [8] also accounts for the 
possibility that signals can be true or false; they are true when the producing-mechanism achieves its 
function and false when it does not. Hence, some authors are sympathetic to this account (Allen and 
Saidel 1998; Godfrey-Smith 2013; Artiga 2014).  
Deceptive signals remain problematic, however. The producing mechanism of the predatory firefly 
achieves its function when it produces a mimicking signal in the presence of itself, the predator. But 
the co-occurrence of female-type light pulses with a predator is not the normal condition of the males’ 
consuming mechanism; it is not the kind of circumstance under which males’ responses resulted in 
matings. The predators’ light pulses therefore do not belong to a cooperative system, and hence lack 
representational content (Stegmann 2009). However, Artiga (2014) maintains that the light pulses can 
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be individuated so that they do belong to a cooperative system. Another move is to accept the 
argument’s conclusion but maintain that it is unproblematic: essentially, males just mistake content-
free mimics for meaningful models (Adams and Beighley 2013; Artiga 2014).  
I prefer to abandon Millikan’s cooperation requirement and simply let receivers determine signal 
content (Stegmann 2009; 2013). Here is my proposal: 
 
[9] S’s content is X iff (1) S elicits a response B in a receiver and (2) the receiver acquired its B-
disposition due to past S-tokens that co-occurred with Xs  
 
where S is a token entity; B may or may not be a behavioral response; and receivers can acquire 
responses through learning and/or evolution. Consider firefly signals. A female-type light pulse (S) 
prompts a male to approach (B), and the male acquired this disposition due to an evolutionary process 
in which past light pulses of this kind co-occurred with conspecific females (X). The content of the 
light pulse is therefore the presence of a conspecific female. Crucially, the light pulse has this content 
independently of whether it was produced by a conspecific female or by a predator. This is because the 
content is determined only by a historical fact about the receiver. It is worth noting that the co-
occurrence of S and X can be a correlation, as in this example, or a one-off coincidence, as in one-trial 
learning.  
One implication of [9] is that signals have specific contents only in virtue of, and relative to, certain 
receivers. This implication explains why the same signal can mean different things to different 
receivers {{296 Smith,WJ. 1977; 555 Stegmann,Ulrich E. 2009}} and renders it applicable to cues. 
Furthermore, content attributions become testable. To claim that (1) ‘this female-type light pulse 
signals the presence of a female’ is equivalent to claiming that (2) ‘the presence of a female is the 
acquisition condition of the receiver’s response’. Whether or not the latter claim is true can be tested.  
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Finally, [9] renders content attributions explanatory. For example, the presence of females (the 
acquisition condition/content) explains why male fireflies tend to approach female-type light pulses.  
Despite these attractions, [9] faces challenges like the demarcation of acquisition conditions and 
complications due to stimulus categorizations by receivers. It is also vulnerable to some of the 
objections raised against Millikan’s theory. Among the latter are the counter-intuitive consequences 
when signals are not triggered by S, but rather by a state Y that shares a common cause with S 
(Godfrey-Smith 2013), or the view that representational content achieves no explanatory gain over and 
above correlations (as Rescorla 2013, has argued with respect to bees). Nevertheless, I believe that [9] 
offers the best prospects for developing a successful theory of signal content.  
 
 
Notes 
2 For instance, the classification based on whether the information is about the sender or a third party 
(e.g. Halliday 1983; Krebs and Dawkins 1984), or the classification distinguishing between 
“indices”, “icons”, and “symbols” (Maynard Smith and Harper 2003).  
3 If signals carried (mostly) false information, then responding to them would not be an evolutionarily 
stable strategy for receivers (Maynard Smith and Harper 2003). 
4 Kristin Andrews (pers. comm.) notes that one might understand probabilities in terms of “degrees of 
cognitive representations”, while remaining neutral about whether those cognitive representations are 
beliefs. 
5 The distinction originated with Grice’s distinction between “natural” and “non-natural meaning”.  
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Further Reading 
An illuminating, early philosophical treatment of animal communication is J. Bennett, Linguistic 
Behaviour (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), §62. According to R. G. Millikan, The 
Varieties of Meaning (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), animal signals have representational 
content. For A. Scarantino, “Information as a Probabilistic Difference Maker,” Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 93 (2015): 419-43, they carry natural information. J. Bradbury & S. Vehrencamp, 
Principles of Animal Communication (Sunderland, MA: Sinauer, 2011) is the principal textbook in the 
information tradition. Contributors from different fields discuss informational and non-informational 
accounts in U. Stegmann (ed.), Animal Communication Theory: Information and Influence 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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